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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

TIPPING THE BALANCE BACK: AN ARGUMENT FOR THE MIXED
MOTIVE THEORY UNDER THE ADEA

INTRODUCTION
One day in May 2010, Gregory Wehking, a clerical clerk, sat nervously in
his boss Rachel Moro’s office.1 His employer, the Bown Company, was
undergoing restructuring, and his job could be in jeopardy. Gregory didn’t
want to lose his job because he enjoyed working; he thought at the age of 66 it
would be difficult to find a new job; and he needed the income to pay the
family’s bills. Ms. Moro started the meeting by putting Gregory at ease when
she spoke highly of his performance record. However, the meeting’s tone
changed quickly. Gregory’s boss next noted Gregory had been with the Bown
Company for quite a long time, over 35 years. Then, Ms. Moro asked Gregory
how old he was. Upon learning Gregory was 66 years old, she suggested he
retire. Gregory protested, and he told her he did not want to retire; he felt
good, and he liked to work. Despite his protest, Ms. Moro fired Gregory.
Gregory was fired during the Bown Company’s corporate restructuring,
during which it reduced the number of clerical clerk positions. At Gregory’s
office, a younger clerical clerk employee was allowed to keep her job. After
the restructuring, the Bown Company had positions similar to a clerical clerk
available in Gregory’s office and other offices. Gregory was qualified for
these positions. The Bown Company has a history of providing job training
when transferring employees to new positions. The Bown Company did not
offer to relocate any clerical employees to different cities. Gregory was not
offered any of these positions.
Despite some strong evidence Gregory’s boss used his age as a factor in
the termination, he cannot state a viable claim under the Age Discrimination
Employment Act (“ADEA”). Gregory was required, under “but for” causation,
to show the Bown Company fired him because of his age and that age was a
determinative factor in his firing. Since the Bown Company reduced
Gregory’s position during its corporate restructuring, it can claim more than
half of its reason for firing Gregory resulted from the restructuring. Without
the mixed motive theory, Gregory could not prove his age motivated his firing.
The court dismissed Gregory’s age discrimination claim. The Bown Company
was not required to defend its decision to fire Gregory.

1. This hypothetical is based on Hnizdor v. Pyramid Mouldings, Inc., No. 05 C 1740, 2010
WL 1752544, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 30, 2010).
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Gregory is not alone.
All too often plaintiffs lose employment
discrimination suits.2 Of the 100,000 employment discrimination claims filed
with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) each year,
roughly 20,000 cases are filed in federal court.3 “Only about fifteen percent of
the claims filed with the [EEOC] result in some relief being provided to
plaintiffs, a percentage that tends to fall below other administrative claims.”4
While discrimination cases are already very difficult for plaintiffs to win,
the Supreme Court recently made it more difficult to win an age discrimination
claim under the ADEA claim. In Gross v. FBL Financial Services, the Court
removed the mixed motive theory from the ADEA framework and left behind
the “but for” causation analysis.5 “But for” causation imperfectly serves the
purpose of the ADEA because it does not account for the human decision
making process.6 Further, the standard favors the defendant, which limits the
law’s deterrent effect and increases the chance an older worker will be harmed
mentally and economically by discrimination.7 The mixed motive theory
should be available under the ADEA.
This Comment first explores the statutory and case law histories of the
Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 1991 and the ADEA, culminating with Gross.
Second, it proposes viable interpretations of the ADEA that bring the mixed
motive theory within the ADEA framework. Finally, it explains why the
ADEA still needs the mixed motive theory.
I. BACKGROUND OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACTS AND AGE DISCRIMINATION
EMPLOYMENT ACT
In response to growing societal pressures to value and protect certain
classes of people from discrimination at the federal level, Congress enacted the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“CRA of 1964”).8 The Act, specifically Title VII,
protects an individual based on his or her race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.9 It recognizes, however, the protected status may be explicitly
considered with bone fide occupational qualifications (“BFOQ”) or
disproportionately affected if that practice is a business necessity.10 The

2. Michael Selmi, Why are Employment Discrimination Cases So Hard to Win?, 61 LA. L.
REV. 555, 561 (2001).
3. Id. at 557–58 & n.10 (the years surveyed were 1992-1999).
4. Id. at 558.
5. Gross v. FBL Fin. Serv., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2350 (2009).
6. See infra Part IV.B.1.
7. See infra Part IV.B.2.
8. RAYMOND F. GREGORY, AGE DISCRIMINATION IN THE AMERICAN WORKPLACE: OLD
AT A YOUNG AGE 16–17 (2001).
9. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006).
10. Id.; Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 242 (1989) (plurality opinion); Griggs
v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
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overall purpose of Title VII is to protect individuals in these classes from
adverse employment decisions because of his or her protected status.11 In
short, employment ought to be based on an individual’s abilities, but at the
very least, employers ought not to discriminate systematically against members
of traditionally disadvantaged groups.
Drafts of the CRA of 1964 included age as a protected status,12 but the
final version of this CRA excluded age.13 Congress concluded age differed
from the Title VII protected statuses and therefore ordered the Secretary of
Labor W. Willard Wirtz to determine if age discrimination should be similarly
prohibited.14
During this time, age discrimination was not uncommon. For example, by
the 1890s and 1900s, it was commonplace for workers over forty to be shut out
of the workforce.15 A 1957 survey of 121 companies found employers were
more likely not to hire women aged thirty-five years or more and men aged
thirty years or more because of their age.16 Fifty-six percent of these
employers would not even consider an application from a woman who was
over the age of fifty.17 Forty-two percent of these employers would not
consider a man’s application if he was over fifty.18
Secretary Wirtz’s report revealed no surprises: older workers were in need
of statutory protection from age discrimination. The report contained five
basic premises. First, many employers have implicit or explicit age limits in
which they will hire or retain employees.19 Second, by implementing these age
limits, employers notably affect the rights and opportunities of those
employees.20 Third, though age discrimination differs from race or religious
discrimination because age stereotypes are typically not fueled by animus,21
age stereotypes are still not based on objective fact.22 Fourth, the performance

11. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.
12. GREGORY, supra note 8, at 17.
13. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.
14. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 715, 78 Stat. 241, 265 (codified at 42
U.S.C. 2000e-14 (2006)); DEP’T. OF LABOR, SEC. OF LABOR, THE OLDER AMERICAN WORKER:
AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT iii (1965).
15. KERRY SEGRAVE, AGE DISCRIMINATION BY EMPLOYERS 5 (2001).
16. Id. at 86 (citing Old Men of 30, Crones of 35 Now Feel First Hiring Bars Because of
Age, BUS. WK., July 20, 1957, at 38).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. GREGORY, supra note 8, at 17; DEP’T. OF LABOR, supra note 14, at 3, 16–17.
20. GREGORY, supra note 8, at 17.
21. The stereotypes can still be harmful without animus. 29 U.S.C. § 621(a) (2006).
Accordingly, animus is not required to violate the statute. E.E.O.C. v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226,
231 (1983).
22. GREGORY, supra note 8, at 17; DEP’T. OF LABOR, supra note 14, at 16–17.
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of older workers was generally at or above the level of their younger cohorts.23
Finally, age discrimination is harmful to the national economy because it
removes a large number of able-bodied workers from the work force, drives up
the costs of unemployment benefits and Social Security, and causes economic
and psychological injury to older workers.24
As a result, in 1967, Congress passed the ADEA.25 The ADEA’s purpose
is “to promote employment of older persons based on their ability rather than
age.”26 Like Title VII, the ADEA prohibits employment decisions based on
protected status—here, age.27 A person belongs to the protected class once he
or she is age forty or older.28 The ADEA also recognizes two instances where
employers can treat older workers worse than younger workers.29
The ADEA’s first exception BFOQ is the affirmative defense to disparate
treatment, or explicit age-based classification. A BFOQ is limited to situations
that are reasonably necessary to the business’ operation.30 The Supreme Court
and the EEOC narrowly define BFOQ.31 An employer will only be allowed to
limit a particular job to someone under thirty-nine if, for example, the
functions of the job are age-linked or people over a certain age cannot do the
work without endangering the safety of others.32 There are few jobs that meet
these stringent criteria.
The second exception is the affirmative defense to disparate impact:
reasonable factors other than age (“RFOA”).33 A disparate impact is not illegal

23. GREGORY, supra note 8, at 17; DEP’T. OF LABOR, supra note 14, at 16–17.
24. GREGORY, supra note 8, at 17; DEP’T. OF LABOR, supra note 14, at 97–104.
25. Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634 (2006).
26. 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (2006). Today older workers face the negative stereotypes of
inadaptability, incompetence with technology, and inability to learn new technology. Barbara L.
Hassell et al., An Examination of Beliefs about Older Workers: Do Stereotypes Still Exist?, 16 J.
OF ORG. BEHAV. 457, 458 (1995). However, positive stereotypes are associated with older
workers: loyally and experience. Id. at 459.
27. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)-(c) (2006).
28. Id. at § 631(a).
29. Id. at § 623(f).
30. Id. at § 623(f)(1).
31. W. Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S 400, 412 (1985); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S.
321, 333 (1977); Tullis v. Lear Sch., Inc., 874 F.2d 1489, 1491 (11th Cir. 1989); Open Letter
from Dianna B. Johnston, Assistant Legal Counsel, Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n
(July 25, 2002), http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/foia/letters/2002/adea_liability_insurance.html.
32. W. Air Lines, Inc., 472 U.S at 412–14.
33. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1). Disparate impact differs from disparate treatment because with
disparate treatment the employer explicitly uses age as the criterion for the employment decision.
Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610–12 (1993). If the employer’s decision is not
made because of age itself, there is no disparate treatment even if the reason is age based. Id.
The exception is if the employer chose the reason to target older people. Id. However if this
reason does not constitute as disparate treatment, it might still cause an illegal disparate impact.
Id.
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if a factor other than age is reasonable, which is something less than a business
necessity as required by Title VII.34 RFOA marks a substantial distinction
from Title VII because the RFOA exception is interpreted broadly.35 Further, a
RFOA does not need to be the least discriminatory option available.36 In order
to successfully use the RFOA defense, the criterion only needs to be
reasonable.37
Overall, the ADEA and Title VII are strikingly similar in purpose and in
creation of negative rights.38 The main difference, albeit a substantial
difference, is the RFOA exception in the ADEA. Notwithstanding this
difference, from the 1960s to the summer of 2009, courts, including the
Supreme Court, analyzed the ADEA and Title VII similarly.39 Many analyses
of the ADEA heavily borrowed from the analyses of Title VII. Even as late as
2005 in Smith v. City of Jackson, the Supreme Court held Congress intended
the ADEA to be subject to the same analysis used in Title VII because
Congress used the same language in each statute and enacted each within a
short time span.40 The Court departed from this longstanding practice in
Gross.
II. CASE LAW HISTORY
After Congress passes a law, that law is not self-enforcing. Rather, the
judiciary must interpret the meaning of the text and apply the law to particular
factual scenarios to fully flesh out its meaning. A statute’s meaning can be
static or dynamic over time because of influences such as an individual judge’s
philosophy and/or current societal views. Professor William Murphy, in
observing the Supreme Court’s treatment of anti-discrimination law, notes that
not since the New Deal has the Court interpreted statutes in such a hostile
manner by severely restricting these laws’ applicability.41 Congress passed the
anti-discrimination laws to provide greater protection for employees,42 but the
Supreme Court has largely interpreted these laws, including the ADEA, to
favor employers.43 Over the years, various courts have interpreted the ADEA

34. Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 238 (2005).
35. Id. at 240; Hazen Paper, 507 U.S. at 610–14.
36. Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab., 554 U.S. 84, 95–96 (2008).
37. Smith, 544 U.S. at 238–39.
38. See 29 U.S.C. § 623 (2006); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006); Smith, 544 U.S. at 233.
39. Smith, 544 U.S. at 233–43; Gross v. FBL Fin. Serv., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2354–55 (2009)
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
40. Smith, 544 U.S. at 233; 29 U.S.C. § 623; 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2.
41. William P. Murphy, Meandering Musings about Discrimination Law, 10 LAB. LAW.
649, 654 (1994) (noting in the 1989 session, the Supreme Court found for the employer in 13 of
the 14 employment law cases).
42. 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (2006); see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.
43. Murphy, supra note 41, at 654.
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to include the disparate impact theory as well as the disparate treatment theory
and its mixed motives variation.44 Of the three, the latter two, disparate
treatment and mixed motives, will be the focus of this Comment.
Under disparate impact, an employer is liable for its actions if they are
discriminatory in operation, whether or not they have a discriminatory purpose
or appear facially neutral in the abstract.45 An employer, under Title VII, may
avoid liability by showing the practice is a business necessity.46 In 1989, the
plaintiffs in Wards Cove Packing v. Atonio presented statistical evidence in
order to satisfy their burden of persuasion.47 The Supreme Court held the
plaintiffs could not establish causation and therefore carry their burden by
merely showing statistical deviations.48 A plaintiff must identify the specific
employment practice that is the source of the statistical disparity in order to
establish a prima facie case of disparate impact.49 Then, the defendant bears
the burden to demonstrate the requirement is a business necessity.50 If the
defendant meets the burden, the plaintiff may still prevail if he or she shows
other less discriminatory methods were available to reach the employer’s
desired goal(s).51
The Supreme Court recognized the disparate impact theory under the
ADEA in Smith v. City of Jackson.52 The Court held Wards Cove, a case
Congress statutorily overrode,53 controls the ADEA disparate impact theory.54

44. Smith, 544 U.S. at 232 (using the disparate impact theory under the ADEA); Hazen
Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 609 (1993) (using the disparate treatment theory under the
ADEA); Rachid v. Jack in the Box Inc., 376 F.3d 305, 312 (5th Cir. 2004) (using the mixed
motive theory under the ADEA).
45. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431–32 (1971).
46. Id. A business necessity is a practice that “accurately—but not perfectly—ascertains an
applicant’s ability to perform successfully the job in question.” El v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 479
F.3d 232, 242 (3d Cir. 2007).
47. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 657 (1989), superseded by statute,
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 2, 105 Stat. 1071.
48. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 657.
49. See id. at 650–52.
50. Id. at 658.
51. Id. at 660.
52. 544 U.S. 228, 240 (2005).
53.
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 rejects many, but not all, of the principles that the majority
had adopted in Wards Cove. Section 105(a) retains the requirement of Wards Cove that a
complainant isolate particular practices causing disparate impact. It allows the parties,
however, to view the entire decision-making process as one employment practice if the
complaining party shows that one cannot separate the elements of an employer’s
decisionmaking [sic] process analytically. The Act is broad enough to cover the situation
where interaction of two or more components in hiring or promotion causes the adverse
impact.
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Differences exist between disparate impact under Title VII and the ADEA.
Unlike Title VII’s narrowly-construed business necessity defense, the ADEA’s
RFOA defense is broadly construed.55
Disparate treatment cases, by far the more prototypical case, focus on
intentional discrimination.56 A plaintiff must show three elements to succeed:
1) discriminatory intent, 2) differential treatment “because of” a protected
status, and 3) a link between the discriminatory intent and the differential
In a motion for summary judgment, the McDonnell
treatment.57
Douglas/Burdine test can be used to establish a prima facie case.58 This test
largely serves a procedural function: once the plaintiff shows a prima facie
case of discrimination, a presumption of discrimination is raised.59 Then, the
employer must “articulate some legitimate, non-discriminatory reason” for the
different treatment.60 If the employer does this, the presumption of
discrimination disappears and becomes only a permissible inference.61 At this

Ronald D. Rotunda, The Civil Rights Act of 1991: A Brief Introductory Analysis of the
Congressional Response to Judicial Interpretation, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 923, 933–34 (1993).
54. Smith, 544 U.S. at 240.
55. Id. A RFOA, unlike a business necessity, only needs to be reasonable and not necessary.
Id. at 253. Reasonableness does not require relevance; however, if the explanation is
unreasonable, there is an inference of pretext for intentional discrimination. Id.
56. Int’l Bd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977); MICHAEL J.
ZIMMER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 2 (7th ed. 2008).
57. ZIMMER ET AL., supra note 56, at 2, 6, 86 (“[T]he Court [in Reeves v. Sanderson
Plumbing] instructed the lower courts to take a more holistic review of the record evidence and
reminded them to draw all inferences in favor of the party opposing summary judgment . . . . The
Court accepted any evidence indicating discrimination as relevant and probative of the ultimate
question of discrimination and made clear that cases were not confined to any particular theory or
claim of discrimination”); Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing, 530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000) (holding the
plaintiff’s ultimate burden is to persuade the trier of fact that the adverse employment action
happened because of his or her protected status).
58. Tex. Dept. of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252–53 (1981).
59. Id. at 254; Reeves, 530 U.S. at 142–43; McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.
792, 802 (1973). The prima facie test is flexible and bends itself to the factual circumstances.
Webb v. Level 3 Commc’ns, LLC, 167 F. App’x. 725, 728 (10th Cir. 2006) (noting the forth
prong of the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine test is modified in a Reduction in Force situation
because the employee is not always replaced); Berquist v. Wash. Mut. Bank, 500 F.3d 344, 349–
51 (5th Cir. 2007) (noting the fourth prong consists of showing the plaintiff “was either i)
replaced by someone outside the protected class, ii) replaced by someone younger, or iii)
otherwise discharged because of his age.”); Bellaver v. Quanex Corp., 200 F.3d 485, 494 (7th Cir.
2000) (“Recognizing that these burdens should not be applied rigidly, we have adapted them in
special cases to reflect more fairly and accurately the underlying reality of the workplace.”).
60. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
61. Id. at 807; Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255 n.10.
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point, the plaintiff can only prevail by showing the employer’s proffered
reason is a pretext for discrimination.62
The Supreme Court in Hazen Paper v. Biggins incorporated the disparate
treatment theory in the ADEA. An employer is liable if the adverse
employment action is motivated by age itself.63 But, if a decision is motivated
by something that is not literally age, even though it is closely correlated with
age, the employer is not liable.64 A decision to terminate an employee because
his pension is vesting is a decision based on a factor closely correlated with
age.65 Such a decision is not rooted in the behavior the ADEA seeks to
discourage.66 Thus, the Court concluded it is permissible under the ADEA to
base employment decisions on pension plans vesting, even though these
employees are likely to be within the protected class.67
The Supreme Court in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins realized that forcing
the plaintiff to prove the discriminatory intent to be more than half of the
decision’s motivation proved untenable and defeated the purpose of Title VII.68
Decisions, such as employment decisions, result from a variety of
motivations.69 Therefore, the plurality established the mixed motive theory
62. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 807; Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255–56. A plaintiff shows
pretext by demonstrating the reason offered by the defendant in court is not the reason for the
defendant’s actions. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 143.
63. Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggens, 507 U.S. 604, 611 (1993).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 610–11.
67. Id. at 612–13. Though no liability was found under the ADEA, Employee Retirement
Income Security Act bars Hazen Paper’s action that prevented the vesting of the pension plan. 29
U.S.C. § 1001 (2006).
Employment discrimination cases are fact intensive. In Hazen Paper, the Court focuses
on the pension plan vesting in only ten years. 507 U.S. at 611. Because the vesting period is only
ten years, employees under forty could have pensions vesting. Id. Arguably if the pension vested
after twenty-five years of service, the Hazen Paper decision may have been different because if
an employee started at age 18, (s)he would be 43 when the pension vested.
The Court has used similar reasoning in Title VII sex discrimination claims. In General
Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, the Court held the exclusion of pregnancy from an employer’s short-term
disability plan was not discrimination based on sex. 429 U.S. 125, 145–46 (1976). Pregnancy,
though closely correlated to sex, is analytically distinct from sex. The plan created the groups
non-pregnant persons and pregnant women. Id. at 135. Non-pregnant persons (women and men)
were covered. Id. Further, this disability program was not based on a sex animus or with a
purpose to discriminate against women. Id. at 136, 138. In response to Gilbert, Congress passed
the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, which stated “because of” sex includes decisions made on the
basis of pregnancy. Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2006)).
68. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 240–41 (1989) (plurality opinion).
69. Id. Consider this hiring hypothetical: A school district superintendent will be the
deciding vote in the hiring of a new principal. WAYNE K. HOY & C. JOHN TARTER,
ADMINISTRATORS SOLVING PROBLEMS OF PRACTICE: DECISION-MAKING CONCEPTS, CASES,
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under disparate treatment, although not without first causing confusion over
what the controlling opinion was and then what it meant.70 The plurality did
agree liability attached when a plaintiff showed an employer was motivated
even in part by the employee’s protected status.71 The employer, then, may
avoid liability if the employer can show, usually with objective evidence, by a
preponderance of the evidence the same decision would have been made
absent the protected status.72
The plurality’s definition of “because of” stems from the statute’s text and
structure. First, the plurality used a textual approach and simply considered a
common understanding of the language. “Because of” was not colloquial
shorthand for “but for” or sole causation; this interpretation misunderstood the
text and context of Title VII.73 “Because of” meant the protected status
motivated the decision.74 For the plurality, the purpose of the act was violated
if the employer relied on the protected status at all in forming its decision.75
The textual argument is then supported by a structural one. Congress
acknowledged protected statuses could be considered in the BFOQ affirmative
defense.76 No other provision of Title VII indicates it is proper to consider the
protected status under the disparate treatment theory.77 The absence of other
exceptions indicates Congress allows decision makers to consider protected
statuses in conjunction with BFOQs and at no other time.78
Justice O’Connor concurred in the Court’s opinion, finding an employer
could be liable if part of its decision was based on a protected status, in spite of
the fact she believed “because of” actually does mean “but for.”79 She
recognized:

AND CONSEQUENCES

113 (1995). The superintendent feels pressure from the board of education
to find a new hire that will fill the shoes of the old beloved principal. Id. at 110. Minority parents
pressure the superintendant to focus more on the minority students’ needs. Id. at 111. These
parents would like to see a minority principal. Id. The school board wants the new principal to
be highly educated with impeccable credentials. Id. The school’s current vice president expects
to be appointed principal. Id. at 112. In this simple scenario, the superintendant only feels
pressure from five sources. By the time the superintendant has made a recommendation, she will
have considered a multitude of factors.
70. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 247 n.12.
71. Id. at 258.
72. Id. After the Civil Rights Act of 1991, a Defendant may avoid damages but not liability.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (2006).
73. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 240.
74. Id. at 240–41.
75. Id. at 242.
76. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (2006)).
77. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)).
78. Id.
79. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 262 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
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Particularity in the context of the professional world, where decisions are often
made by collegial bodies on the basis of largely subjective criteria, requiring
the plaintiff to prove that any one fact was definitive cause of the decision
makers’ act may be tantamount to declaring Title VII inapplicable to such
80
decisions.

Because of the difficulty in demonstrating the “but for” reason for the action,
the plaintiff then bears the burden to prove the protected trait was a substantial
factor in the adverse employment decision.81 The burden of proof—substantial
factor—is required in part because the protected traits of race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin can never be completely discounted in the professional
world.82 For Justice O’Connor, a high standard of proof is required because
people can observe and comment on these traits benignly, while not harboring
discriminatory animus.83 In addition, the plaintiff must show the protected
status was a substantial factor through direct evidence only.84 A requirement
of direct evidence better serves Title VII’s deterrent function by identifying the
situations clearly targeted by the statute.85 Once the burden shifted, the
employer could avoid liability by showing more likely than not it would have
made the same decision absent the protected status.86
Justice White concurred that a plaintiff did not need to show the protected
status was the sole cause in order to shift the burden to the defendant.87 He
agreed with the plurality the plaintiff met his or her burden by showing the
decision was in part motivated by illegal factors.88 Though, unlike the
plurality, he believes an employer could satisfy its burden with objective
evidence or with credible testimony.89 Unlike Justice O’Connor, but like the
plurality, he is silent on whether or not direct evidence is required to shift the
burdens.90 Similar to the plurality and Justice O’Connor, he believed the
defendant could avoid liability if it could prove by a preponderance of the
evidence it would have taken the same action absent the protected status.91
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 (“CRA of 1991”) attempted to codify and
overrule various Supreme Court decisions from the 1980s, including Price

80. Id. at 273.
81. Id. at 276.
82. Id. at 277.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 276.
85. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 276.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 259 (White, J., concurring).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 261
90. See id. at 258–60.
91. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 253; id. at 260 (White, J., concurring); id. at 276
(O’Connor, J., concurring).
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Waterhouse.92 At this time, Congress codified the mixed motive theory.93
Under § 2000e-2(m), a defendant is liable for discriminatory conduct if the
plaintiff can show a protected status was a motivating factor, even if other
legal factors also motivated the decision.94 Congress, when drafting § 2000e2(m), chose the plurality and White’s “motivating” factor standard and not
Justice O’Connor’s “substantial” factor.95 Congress, however, rejected the
Price Waterhouse plurality scheme that allowed a defendant to avoid liability
if it could show by a preponderance of the evidence it would have acted the
same absent the protected class.96 While the burden shifting framework
remained, § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) no longer allowed the employer to avoid liability
but, instead, limited the damages available to the plaintiff.97 The ADEA text
was not amended explicitly to include the mixed motive language or damages
provision.98
Despite its attempt, the amendment only partially clarified the confusion of
Price Waterhouse.99 It provides that unlawful employment practices occur
when illegal factors are a motivating factor in the decision.100 Therefore, the
amendment addresses to what degree the illegal factors can play a role in a
decision before liability is attached, which is none.101 Nevertheless, the
92. Civil Rights Act of 1991, supra note 47, at § 2.
93. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2006).
94. Id.
95. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 244–45 (plurality opinion); id. at 259 (White, J.,
concurring); id. at 261–62, 276 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
96. Id. at 258 (plurality opinion); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (2006).
97. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B).
(A) No order of the court shall require the admission or reinstatement of an individual as a
member of a union, or the hiring, reinstatement, or promotion of an individual as an
employee, or the payment to him of any back pay, if such individual was refused
admission, suspended, or expelled, or was refused employment or advancement or was
suspended or discharged for any reason other than discrimination on account of race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin or in violation of section 2000e-3(a) of this title.
(B) On a claim in which an individual proves a violation under section 2000e-2(m) of this
title and a respondent demonstrates that the respondent would have taken the same action
in the absence of the impermissible motivating factor, the court-(i) may grant declaratory relief, injunctive relief (except as provided in clause (ii)), and
attorney’s fees and costs demonstrated to be directly attributable only to the pursuit of a
claim under section 2000e-2(m) of this title; and
(ii) shall not award damages or issue an order requiring any admission, reinstatement,
hiring, promotion, or payment, described in subparagraph (A).
Id. at § 2000e-5(g)(2).
98. Age Discrimination in Employment Act, supra note 25; Gross v. FBL Fin. Serv., 129 S.
Ct. 2343, 2349 (2009). Other explicit amendments, however, were made to the ADEA at this
time. Age Discrimination in Employment Act, supra note 25; Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2349.
99. See Desert Palace v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 92 (2002).
100. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2006).
101. Id.
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amendment did not address the remaining disagreement between the Justices in
Price Waterhouse about what type of evidence was needed to shift the burden
to the defendant.102 In applying the amendment to mixed motive cases, many
courts found Justice O’Connor’s concurrence controlled and required direct
evidence to shift the burden to the defendant.103 Other courts found
circumstantial evidence to be sufficient because the CRA of 1991 was silent on
a heightened evidentiary standard.104
In Desert Palace v. Costa, the Supreme Court found circumstantial
evidence is sufficient in Title VII cases to obtain a mixed motive instruction
and shift the burden to the defendant.105 The Court based its decision solely on
the statute and not on the pre-amendment Price Waterhouse decision.106 Title
VII’s statutory language does not include a heightened evidentiary standard, so
the Court found there is no heightened evidentiary standard.107
After Price Waterhouse and the CRA of 1991, courts applied the mixed
motive theory in ADEA claims.108 Courts assumed mixed motive existed
under the ADEA because the ADEA uses the same “because of” language that
was held in Price Waterhouse to encompass mixed motives, although the
ADEA text was not amended to include the explicit mixed motive language.109
Because the ADEA did not contain the mixed motives language, a circuit
split developed over whether direct or circumstantial evidence was sufficient to

102. Desert Palace, 539 U.S. at 93–95.
103. Id. at 95. Many Courts treated O’Connor’s concurrence as Price Waterhouse’s
controlling opinion based on the Marks doctrine, which states that when there is a plurality, the
controlling opinion is the one based on the narrowest grounds. Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2357 (Steven,
J., dissenting).
104. Dessert Palace, 539 U.S. at 97.
105. Id. at 98–99.
106. Id. at 99. In her Desert Palace concurrence, Justice O’Connor highlighted the
importance of the 1991 amendments by specifically noting circumstantial evidence is allowed
only because of the 1991 amendments; otherwise, only direct evidence would suffice. Id. at 102
(O’Connor, J., concurring). Scholars and academics disagree over Desert Palace’s effect on the
McDonnell Douglas/Burdine test. For the argument that Desert Palace replaced the McDonnell
Douglas/Burdine test, see William R. Corbett, McDonnell Douglas, 1973-2003: May You Rest in
Peace?, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 199, 213–14 (2003). For the argument that McDonnell
Douglas/Burdine is only applicable in limited settings, see Michael J. Zimmer, The New
Discrimination Law: Price Waterhouse is Dead, Whither McDonnell Douglas?, 53 EMORY L.J.
1887, 1931–32 (2004). For the argument that Desert Palace had no effect on McDonnell
Douglas/Burdine, see Griffith v. City of Des Moines, 387 F.3d 733, 735 (8th Cir. 2004).
107. Desert Palace, 539 U.S. at 98–99.
108. For example, the Second Circuit in Donovan v. Milk Mktg. affirmed that Price
Waterhouse’s mixed motive theory applied to the ADEA. Donovan v. Milk Mktg., 243 F.3d 584,
586 (2d Cir. 2001); Rachid v. Jack in the Box, 376 F.3d 305, 312 (5th Cir. 2004).
109. Age Discrimination in Employment Act, supra note 25; Gross v. FBL Fin. Serv., 129 S.
Ct. 2343, 2349 (2009).
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shift the burden to the defendant for a mixed motive claim.110 The Desert
Palace decision was based on statutory text not found in the ADEA.111 Yet, in
Rachid v. Jack in the Box the Fifth Circuit held the mixed motive theory—post
Desert Palace—did not require direct evidence under the ADEA.112 The
theory is a merging of the pre-amendment theories from McDonnell
Douglas/Burdine and Price Waterhouse.113 In justifying its holding, the Fifth
Circuit noted the ADEA and Title VII are both similarly silent as to a
heightened evidentiary standard and the two statute’s texts are analyzed almost
identically.114
Gross v. FBL Financial Services opposed Rachid. The Eighth Circuit,
relying on O’Connor’s Price Waterhouse concurrence, held a plaintiff must
present direct evidence in order to receive a mixed motive instruction.115
Direct evidence, for the Eighth Circuit, properly showed the causal link
between the decision and discriminatory animus.116
The plaintiff, Gross, petitioned for certiorari on the availability of a mixed
motive jury instruction with only circumstantial evidence.117 However, the
Supreme Court ruled on a threshold issue: the mixed motive theory’s
availability under the ADEA.118 Peculiarly, the origin of the Supreme Court’s
decision is not found in the petition for certiorari, only in the respondent’s
brief.119 The defense counsel’s statement at oral argument adeptly summarizes
the respondent and the Court’s reasoning. He urged:
I would hope that the Court would seize upon this as an opportunity to provide
some significant clarity in the law, rather than seize this as an opportunity to
decide this case on the potentially most narrow ground, which . . . will not do
anything to resolve the mass confusion that seems to exist among the lower
120
courts.

The Court seized the opportunity to end the confusion by completely removing
its perceived source—the mixed motive theory.121 Now, the mixed motive
theory is not available under the ADEA.122

110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2348; Rachid, 376 F.3d at 311.
Desert Palace, 539 U.S. at 99.
Rachid, 376 F.3d at 311–12.
Id.
Id. at 311.
Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2348.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2348 n.1; Brief for Respondent at 1, Gross, 129 S. Ct. 2343 (No. 08-441).
Transcript of Oral Argument at 29:20–21, Gross, 129 S. Ct. 2343 (No. 08-441).
Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2348.
Id.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

242

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXX:229

The Court squarely based its decision in the CRA of 1991’s mixed motive
amendment to Title VII and the lack of amendment to the ADEA.123 Because
the CRA of 1991 did not amend the ADEA to include the mixed motive theory
in 1991, Desert Palace’s mixed motive theory is inapplicable to the ADEA.124
For the majority, Congress’s silence regarding the ADEA and mixed motive
signaled Congress did not intend the amendment of Title VII to reach the
ADEA.125
Now, after passage of the CRA of 1991, the Court has ruled Title VII
mixed motive case law was inapplicable to the ADEA. So in order to remove
Title VII mixed motive case law from before the CRA of 1991, i.e. Price
Waterhouse, from the analysis, the Court summarily stated it would have
decided that case differently, and thus the analysis did not apply.126 This Court
would not and could not interpret the words “because of such individual’s age”
to encompass a mixed motive theory.127 Even if the Court agreed with the
mixed motive interpretation, it would have eliminated it because history has
shown the burden-shifting framework was difficult to apply.128
In effect, the Court turned the ADEA’s statutory scheme on its head. The
removal of the mixed motive theory meant “because of” means “but for.” For
the plaintiff to recover he or she must show by a preponderance of the
evidence the protected status, age, was the “but for” cause, or sole reason, for
the adverse employment action.129 Only having a “but for” standard
significantly reduces a plaintiff’s chance for a successful ADEA claim.130
With one sweep of the pen, the Supreme Court changed the relationship
between Title VII and the ADEA analysis. The over forty-year history of
substantially interpreting the Acts similarly is now questionable.
III. THE ADEA & MIXED MOTIVE: HOW AND WHY
The Supreme Court made the wrong decision. Eliminating the mixed
motive theory from the ADEA leaves a large segment of the population with
weak protection against discrimination.131 The Court, as it suggested, did not
need to remove this theory.132 The mixed motive theory is not inconsistent
with the ADEA. The theory can be incorporated in the ADEA because it is
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Id. at 2349.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2351–52.
29 U.S.C. § 623(a)–(c) (2006); see generally Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2351–52.
Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2352.
Id.
Id.
JERRY W. HEDGE ET AL., THE AGING WORKFORCE: REALITIES, MYTHS AND
IMPLICATIONS FOR ORGANIZATIONS 45 (2006).
132. Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2350.
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inherent to the statute; Congress intended the CRA of 1991 to apply to the
statute; or the Price Waterhouse mixed motive theory controls the statute.
Further, public policy strongly supports this theory. Discrimination is
economically and mentally harmful.133 In addition, incorporating the mixed
motive theory in the ADEA includes a theory more compatible with human
decision-making.134 A theory such as this will likely find an employer is liable
for its discriminatory actions more often. As a result, the ADEA will have a
larger deterrent effect. Employers will be encouraged to be aware of possible
discriminatory actions and employ people based on individual ability and not
stereotypes.
A.

The ADEA and Mixed Motives: How to Find Mixed Motives

Mixed motive causation exists in the ADEA. The following section
analyzes how the mixed motive theory exists from three distinct analytical
standpoints, beginning with the most desirable interpretation: 1) the mixed
motives theory is inherent because of the statute’s language and purpose; 2) the
CRA of 1991 and its mixed motive amendment applies to the ADEA; and 3)
the mixed motive test articulated in Price Waterhouse controls.
1. Best Analysis: Mixed Motive Theory is Inherent in the ADEA’s Text
and Purpose
Neither the CRA of 1991 nor prior case law are needed to find the mixed
motive theory exists in the ADEA framework. The current language and
purpose of the ADEA on its own supports a finding of the theory.
The ADEA and Title VII have similar origins and were prompted by
similar concerns: to prevent discrimination against employees because
discrimination denies them full participation in the workforce.135 Taking these
factors into account and the ADEA’s text, a mixed motive theory can be found
under the ADEA just as the Price Waterhouse Court found the mixed motives
theory under Title VII. The Gross and Price Waterhouse Courts interpreted
identical language in their respective statutes, save the enumeration of the
protected status.136 If the interpretation can be found by analyzing one statute,
it can be found when interpreting identical language in another statute.
The ADEA was enacted to prevent discrimination in employment.137 As
Professor Blumrosen suggests, when interpreting a statute of this nature, the
Court needs to understand the big picture and consider what Congress tried to

133. See infra Part IV.B.2.
134. See infra Part IV.B.1.
135. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006); 29 U.S.C. § 621 (2006).
136. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 240 (1989) (plurality opinion); Gross, 129
S. Ct. at 2351–52.
137. 29 U.S.C. § 621.
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achieve with the statutory text.138 In other words, let the reason for enacting
the statute give context to the text. The ADEA states: “It shall be unlawful for
an employer to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s age.”139
The key language is “because of.” Here, Congress established the ADEA to
encourage employment decisions based on the individual’s abilities.140
Discrimination is economically and mentally harmful whenever it exists,
whether or not it co-exists with legal factors.141
Consequently, a finding of “but for” causation in the statute is inconsistent
with its purpose. The definition of solely “but for” does not necessarily or
naturally follow from the ADEA’s text, as Justice Thomas suggested.142 After
138. Alfred W. Blumrosen, The Group Interest Concept, Employment Discrimination and
Legislative Intent: The Fallacy of Connecticut v. Teal, 20 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 99, 104–07, 117–
20 (1983). Professor Blumrosen in reviewing Title VII found Title VII employed a novel concept
of seeking to address needs of a select group in society. Id. at 104. Due to the novelty of the
concept, Congress had a difficult time articulating the goals of the legislation with the current
lexicon. Id. Therefore, by gaining an understanding of the Act’s overall purpose, legislative
history, and limitation of the words used and their current and prior definitions, the statute can be
properly interpreted. Id. at 104–07, 117–20.
139. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (2006).
140. Id. at § 62; W. Air Lines v. Criswell, 472 U.S 400, 422 (1985).
141. 29 U.S.C. § 621(a)(4) (2006).
142. Gross v. FBL Fin. Serv., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2350 (2009). For example, post-structuralism
of the postmodern school of thought believes there is no one single definition to any word and
that a word’s definition varies on its context. Peter C. Schanck, Understanding Postmodern
Thought and its Implications for Statutory Interpretation, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2505, 2521 (1992).
In the structuralist view, language and its structures predate the individual and themselves
create meaning, rather than meaning being created by individual consciousness or simply
being out there in nature for people to identify. Meaning is not an objective, fixed “thing”
that language reflects, but is something produced by language. Language, moreover, is a
collective or shared system of signification, consisting of culturally and historically
constituted codes transmitted to people through linguistic structures.
Id. Legal scholars routinely use elements of postmodernism to interpret the law and statutes;
examples include legal realism, critical legal studies, feminist jurisprudence, critical race theory,
pragmatism, and civic republicanism. Id. at 2575–76. Judge Learned Hand espoused similar
beliefs:
All [legislators] have done is to write down certain words which they mean to apply
generally to situations of that kind. To apply these literally may either pervert what was
plainly their general meaning, or leave indisposed of what there is every reason to
suppose they meant to provide for. Thus, it is not enough for the judge just to use a
dictionary. If he should do no more, he might come out with a result which every sensible
man would recognize to be quite the opposite of what was intended; which would
contradict or leave unfulfilled its plain purpose.
Eric Schnapper, Statutory Misinterpretations: A Legal Autopsy, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1095,
1114–15 (1993) (quoting Learned Hand, How Far is a Judge Free in Rendering a Decision?, in
THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 103, 106 (Irving Dillard ed., 1952)).
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all, the Price Waterhouse Court found an entirely different yet plausible
definition of “because of.”143 In his Gross dissent, Stevens adeptly noted that
Webster’s Dictionary does not modify its “because of” definition, which is “by
reason of” or “on account of,” with the words solely or exclusively.144 The text
“because of” only requires a causal link between the ageism and the adverse
employment action. The ADEA’s purpose is to ensure the decision maker did
not act with any age stereotypes.
The ADEA, just like Title VII, wants to eliminate discrimination, so the
causation standard needs to provide incentives for decision makers to not
harbor such animus, or at the very least try to not allow the animus to influence
the decision.145 A high causation threshold standard creates little incentive to
rid oneself of animus because there is a diminished chance of liability.
Therefore, a motivating factor causation standard encourages decision makers
to rid themselves of discriminatory intent because no amount of this intent is
allowed to factor into the employment decision. A finding of liability when
ageism is a motivating factor is consistent with the legislative intent.146 As a
result, “because of” means a motivating factor.
The ADEA’s structure further supports the motivating factor causation
standard. The statute indicates lawful employment decisions can be based on
age when the decision is based on a BFOQ reasonably necessary to the
business.147 The BFOQ section clearly indicates Congress contemplated
situations when age can be a factor in the employment decision.148 Since
Congress indicated one instance and no other instances when employment
decisions can consider age, a motivating factor causation standard is
appropriate.
In keeping with the theme of a lower threshold, a mixed motive causation
standard will be satisfied with the presentation of direct or circumstantial
evidence. In Desert Palace, the Court held absent an explicit heightened
evidentiary standard, the presumed standard is the preponderance of the
evidence, shown with direct or circumstantial evidence.149 Similar to Title
VII’s text, the ADEA is devoid of a heightened evidentiary standard.150
Without an explicit instruction, the law will favor neither circumstantial nor

143. See generally Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
144. Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2354 n.4 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
145. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006); 29 U.S.C. § 621 (2006).
146. 29 U.S.C. § 621.
147. Id. at § 623(f).
148. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 242.
149. Desert Palace v. Costa, 539 U.S. 68, 99–100 (2003).
150. Rachid v. Jack in the Box Inc., 376 F.3d 305, 311 (5th Cir. 2004); 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1)
(2006) (“It shall be unlawful for an employer to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any
individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s age.”).
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direct evidence.151 The subtle distinction between direct and circumstantial
evidence causes categorization to be inconsistent.152 Inconsistencies in
categorization are problematic if one category allows a case to proceed and the
other ends the matter. Further, the use of circumstantial evidence can be more
influential than direct evidence to prove a fact.153 Finally, in other ADEA
contexts, the Court has rejected impositions of other special evidentiary
standards.154 As a result, burdens under the ADEA can be met with
circumstantial evidence.155
The ADEA can be reasonably and should be interpreted to have a mixed
motive causation standard, satisfied with either direct or circumstantial
evidence.
2. Better Analysis: Congress Intended Civil Rights Act of 1991 to Apply
to ADEA Claims
The mixed motive theory is available to the ADEA because of the CRA of
1991. Interpreting the ADEA and the general scheme of anti-discrimination
statutes requires an understanding of Congress’s intent: what are the Act’s
purposes and its intended extent.156
However, Justice Thomas, the author of the Gross majority opinion,
candidly embraces textualism.157 In Harbison v. Bell, Thomas, in his
concurrence, flatly states it is not the Court’s task to interpret statutes “in a way
that it believes consistent with the policy outcome intended by Congress. . . .
Rather, the Court must adopt the interpretation of the statute that is most

151. Desert Palace, 539 U.S. at 99–100.
152. Febres v. Challenger Caribbean Corp., 214 F.3d 57, 59 (1st Cir. 2000); Jennifer R.
Gowens, Plaintiffs’ Direct Evidence Burden in Mixed-Motive Disparate Treatment Cases, 54
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 149, 170–78 (2003).
153. Rogers v. Mo. Pac. R. Co., 352 U.S. 500, 508 n.17 (1957).
154. Gross v. FBL Fin. Serv., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2358 (2009) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
155. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (2006).
156. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 159 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (stating
Title VII should be interpreted in the context of its social purpose); Dolan v. U.S. Postal Serv.,
546 U.S. 481, 486 (2006) (“Interpretation of a word or phrase depends upon reading the whole
statutory text, considering the purpose and context of the statute, and consulting any precedents or
authorities that inform the analysis.”); United States v. Boisdore’s Heirs, 49 U.S. 113, 122 (1850)
(“In expounding a statute, we must not be guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence,
but look to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy.”).
157. Textualism can be understood as a rule-based approach to statutory interpretation. Caleb
Nelson, What is Textualism?, 91 VA. L. REV. 347, 398 (2005). Textualists gravitate to
interpretations that are based on the text of the statute, if the language is otherwise unambiguous.
John F. Manning, Textalism and Legislative Intent, 91 VA. L. REV. 419, 439–40 (2005).
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faithful to its text.”158 Thomas adheres to this philosophy even if his or “the
proper” interpretation of the statute results in “very bad policy.”159
Blind adherence to statutory text is an ill-guided way to interpret statutes.
It leads to interpretations which harm society, fail to reach Congressional
legislative goals, and misunderstand the legislative process and human
nature.160 A belief that statutory text tells it all involves false assumptions that
Congress members fully understood the goals they were trying to reach, that
Congress used the perfect language to convey these goals, and that the text’s
words have a crystallized, universal definition.161 To make this interpretation
tool more palatable some courts justify their exclusive focus on the text
through the Congressional acquiescence theory. This theory is based on the
notion Congress is aware of all the Court’s statutory interpretations.162 So,
Congress must approve of the interpretation if it does not amend a statute to
override an interpretation.163
The Congressional acquiescence theory fails to consider several factors.
Legislation to overrule a statute is expensive and time consuming.164 Merely
because Congress amends a similar statute, it does not necessarily follow
Congress was able to, and chose not to, amend the other statute.165 Even if the
statutes are similar, it is not necessarily easy to garner support or financially
feasible to amend both statutes. 166 So, the failure to amend does not
automatically signify Congress means for the case law to develop divergent
paths.167
A second issue with the Congressional acquiescence theory is
interpretational ambiguity. A Congress member may choose to refrain from
action for reasons other than approval of the Court’s statutory interpretation.

158. Harbison v. Bell, 129 S. Ct. 1481, 1493–94 (2009).
159. Id.
160. See generally Deborah A. Widiss, Shadow Precedent and the Separation of Powers:
Statutory Interpretation of Congressional Overrides, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 511 (2009).
161. Blumrosen, supra note 138, at 111.
162. Jamie Darin Prenkert, Bizarro Statutory Stare Decisis, 28 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L.
217, 236–37 (2007).
163. Id. at 237; Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 488–89 (1940) (“The long time
failure of Congress to alter the Act after it had been judicially construed, and the enactment by
Congress of legislation which implicitly recognizes the judicial construction as effective, is
persuasive of legislative recognition that the judicial construction is the correct one. This is the
more so where, as here, the application of the statute to labor unions has brought forth sharply
conflicting views both on the Court and in Congress, and where after the matter has been fully
brought to the attention of the public and the Congress, the latter has not seen fit to change the
statute.”).
164. Prenkert, supra note 162, at 250.
165. See id.
166. See id.
167. See id.
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For example, the CRA of 1991’s legislative history included a rule of
construction for how the anti-discrimination statutes should be interpreted.168
This amendment was rejected not necessarily for its content but for fear of its
affect. Then President George H.W. Bush believed the provision would spur
needless litigation over how to construe the statute.169 Courts should not place
significance on the failure to act but instead consider whether the proposed
interpretation defeats the law’s purpose.170
Consequently, Congressional overrides need to be guideposts for future
court interpretation.171 In the background, a court should consider that
Congress cannot technically overrule case law, but only make the statutory text
inconsistent with the interpretation Congress seeks to overrule.172 According
to Professor Farber, “enacting legislators would prefer courts give strong
weight to stare decisis in statutory cases, even at the expense of fidelity to the
original legislative deal.”173 In this situation, the interpretative relationship
between Title VII and the ADEA should be preserved.
The Gross majority reasoned the lack of amendment to the ADEA was
significant.174 However, nineteen years had passed since the CRA of 1991,
and throughout this time, courts applied the mixed motive theory to the
ADEA.175 Even FBL Financial’s counsel did not consider the possibility of
removing the mixed motive theory until after the petition for certiorari.176 The
parties and courts assumed the ADEA included a mixed motive theory. Parties
fought over the required evidentiary standard necessary to receive the mixed

168.
SEC. 1107. RULES OF CONSTRUCTION FOR CIVIL RIGHTS LAWS. . . . “(c)
INTERPRETATION.—In interpreting Federal civil rights laws, including laws protecting
against discrimination on the basis of . . . age, . . . courts and administrative agencies shall
not rely on the amendments made by the Civil Rights Act of 1990 as a basis for limiting
the theories of liability, rights, and remedies available under civil rights laws not
expressly amended by such Act.
Howard Eglit, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act, Title VII, and the Civil Rights Act of
1991: Three Acts and a Dog that Didn’t Bark, 39 WAYNE L. REV. 1093, 1161–62 (1993)
(quoting S. 2104, 101st Cong. § 11 (1990), set forth in H.R. REP. NO. 101-755, at 7 (1990) (Conf.
Rep.)).
169. Presidential Message to the Senate Returning Without Approval the Civil Rights Act of
1990, 26 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1634 (Oct. 22, 1990).
170. See Schnapper, supra note 142, at 1140.
171. See Prenkert, supra note 162, at 263; Schnapper, supra note 142, at 1099.
172. Widiss, supra note 160, at 514.
173. Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretation, Legislative Inaction, and Civil Rights, 87
MICH. L. REV. 2, 12–13 (1988).
174. Gross v. FBL Fin. Serv., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2349 (2009).
175. See Rachid v. Jack in the Box, 376 F.3d 305, 310–11 (5th Cir. 2004); Salter v. Alltel
Commc’ns, 407 F. Supp. 2d 730, 734 (E.D.N.C. 2005); Machinchick v. PB Power, 398 F.3d 345,
355 (5th Cir. 2005); Mereish v. Walker, 359 F.3d 330, 340 (4th Cir. 2004).
176. Gross, 129 S. Ct at 2348.
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motive instruction.177 The same logic the Gross majority uses to reach its
conclusion can be used to reach the opposite: Congress approved the use of a
mixed motive analysis. If Congress disapproved of a mixed motive theory in
the ADEA, it would have amended the statute clearly to exclude the theory.
Courts need to keep a bird’s eye view of the state of the law in order to
keep statutory interpretation consistent with Congressional intent. Congress in
the CRA of 1991 rejected the Court’s use of the “plain meaning” statutory
interpretation technique.178 Since Congress rejected a number of “plain
meaning” cases, this interpretation style likely does not properly interpret the
statute.179 Thus, the Gross Court should have looked to Congressional intent
and determined Congress intended the CRA of 1991 to cover the ADEA.
Congress’ failure to exclude the mixed motives theory in ADEA, after over
19 years of including the mixed motive theory, can be seen as Congress’
approval of the theory. If Congress wanted to change the interpretation
scheme of discrimination law, it would have expressly indicated its
disapproval. Absent express disapproval, Congress prefers the Court interpret
the statutes in accordance with its previous history.180
3. The Fallback Analysis: Mixed Motive and Price Waterhouse
At the very least, the ADEA has the mixed motive theory as set forth by
Price Waterhouse. The retention of this mixed motive theory is not ideal
because Congress did partially overrule Price Waterhouse in the CRA of
1991.181 However, this analysis at least keeps the mixed motive theory within
the ADEA and a semblance of stability within the ADEA and discrimination
laws’ framework. Courts should strive to keep stability in statutory
interpretation and should always consider the ramifications of upsetting
precedents.182 When the interpretations of the law remain consistent, the law
becomes predictable. Consistency helps parties avoid the possibility of
liability, and it helps parties know when their rights have been violated and
when to seek redress for their injuries.183
Of course, judicial interpretation of the law as applied to divergent fact
patterns will create inconsistencies. However, this inconsistency happens on
the micro level and can be expected with fact intensive inquiries, such as in
employment discrimination law. The fundamental essence of the law remains
the same. However, Gross creates inconsistency on the macro level because it

177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

See id.
See Schnapper, supra note 142, at 1101.
Id.
Farber, supra note 173, at 12–13.
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2006); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (2006).
Widiss, supra note 160, at 560.
Id.
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has removed the mixed motive theory altogether from the ADEA.184 The
Court should strive to avoid widespread inconsistencies and retain, at the
minimum, Price Waterhouse’s mixed motive theory under the ADEA.
In 2005, the Court in Smith v. City of Jackson was faced with a
substantively similar question: whether there is a disparate impact cause of
action under the ADEA, and if so, what governs the analysis.185 The Supreme
Court held the disparate impact theory, which developed in Title VII case law,
was available under the ADEA.186 Further, it held Wards Cove, a Title VII
case that predated the CRA of 1991, controls the ADEA disparate impact
analysis.187
To reach its holding, the Court examined the almost identical text between
the two acts.188 Because these texts are similar in word choice and enacted
close in time, the Court interpreted the texts similarly.189 The two statutes’
structures are also analogous. The ADEA’s affirmative defense of RFOA is
analogous to Title VII’s affirmative defense of business necessity.190
However, the ADEA’s affirmative defense is interpreted more broadly and,
thus, provides more protection to employers.191 As a result, the Court
184. See Gross v. FBL Fin. Serv., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2349, 2357 (2009) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(“Were the Court truly worried about difficulties faced by trial courts and juries, moreover, it
would not reach today’s decision, which will further complicate every case in which a plaintiff
raises both ADEA and Title VII claims.”); Jamie Darin Prenkert, The Role of Second-Order
Uniformity in Disparate Treatment Law: McDonnell Douglas’s Longevity and the Mixed-Motives
Mess, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 511, 554–56 (2008) (noting courts routinely apply the mixed motive
theory to Americans with Disability Act claims, to Title VII retaliation claims, and to Pregnancy
Discrimination Act claims in spite of the absence of explicit statutory text authorizing the mixed
motive theory); Williams v. District of Columbia, 646 F. Supp. 2d 103, 109 (D.D.C. 2009)
(finding since the Jury Systems Improvement Act’s language “by reason of” is similar to the
ADEA’s “because of,” “by reason of” also means “but for,” as articulated by Gross); Bolmer v.
Oliveria, 594 F.3d 134, 148 (2d Cir. 2010) (questioning whether the mixed motive theory exists
under Title II after Gross).
185. Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 232, 240 (2005); Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2348.
186. Smith, 544 U.S. at 240.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 232–33. In Smith, the Court analyzed this text of the ADEA: “to limit, segregate,
or classify his employees in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of
such individual’s age.” Id. at 233 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (2006)). The Wards Cove Court
had analyzed almost identical text found in Title VII: “to limit, segregate, or classify his
employees in ways that would adversely affect any employee because of the employee’s race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.” Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 645
(1989), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 2, 105 Stat. 1071;
Civil Rights Act of 1964, supra note 14, at § 703(a)(2) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)
(2006)).
189. Smith, 544 U.S. at 233.
190. Id. at 240–41.
191. Id. at 240.
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authorized a very narrow use of disparate impact, which heavily favors
employers.
If the reasoning in Smith v. City of Jackson is followed with Gross, the
unmodified Price Waterhouse holding should control the mixed motive theory
under the ADEA. Price Waterhouse is to Gross as Wards Cove is to Smith.
As determined in Smith, the ADEA and Title VII have similar purposes, which
are achieved with substantially the same language.192 Both Acts encourage
basing employment decisions on an individual’s ability and not on
stereotypes.193 In Price Waterhouse, the interpreted text is identical to the text
interpreted in Wards Cove, which is still the same language interpreted in
Gross and in Smith.194 The ADEA and Title VII both contain the language
“because of.” Neither Act requires the protected employment characteristic to
be the “but for,” or sole cause, for the employment decision.195 Therefore, just
like Price Waterhouse, a decision can be made because of a protected status, so
long as legal factors also motivate the decision.196
In addition, the statutes still have similar structures. Both contain the
BFOQ defense, in which Congress explicitly contemplated when protected
statuses could be considered.197 Since Congress only specifically enumerated
one instance, in all other instances a protected status cannot be a motivating
factor in the decision.198 However, an employer can avoid liability by showing
with a preponderance of the evidence the same decision would have been made
absent the protected status.199
The dissent was correct to have said Justice White’s opinion in Price
Waterhouse controls.200 Under the Marks doctrine, in a plurality opinion, the
narrowest opinion controls.201 In Price Waterhouse, the plurality held the
protected status only needs to be a motivating factor.202 It is silent regarding
whether a plaintiff must present direct evidence to receive a mixed motive
analysis.203 It further held an employer could prove the same decision defense

192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.

Id. at 233.
29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (2006); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006).
Smith, 544 U.S. at 240; Gross v. FBL Fin. Serv., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2350 (2009).
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 240–41 (1989) (plurality opinion).
Id. at 258.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e); 29 U.S.C. § 623(f) (2006).
Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 242 (plurality opinion).
Id. at 258.
Gross v. FBL Fin. Serv., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2356–57 (2009) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977).
Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 258 (plurality opinion).
Id. at 256–58.
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only through objective evidence.204 Importantly, the plurality held a plaintiff
only needs to show the protected status motivated the decision.205
White concurred the protected status need only be a motivating factor. 206
He, like the plurality, is silent on a heightened evidentiary standard that
requires the plaintiff to produce direct evidence to receive the mixed motive
analysis.207 White wrote separate from the plurality because of their
articulation of the same decision defense; he finds instead that employers can
succeed on the credibility of their testimony alone and need not present
objective evidence.208 White concludes an employer can be liable when the
protected status is a motivating factor in the adverse employment action.209
O’Connor concurred that the protected status must be a substantial
factor.210 She, unlike the plurality and White, held a plaintiff can only receive
the mixed motive analysis upon a showing of direct evidence of
discrimination.211 A heightened evidentiary rule, like requiring direct
evidence, departs from the conventional litigation rule.212 A ruling requiring a
heightened standard should be explicitly agreed to and is broader than not
mentioning a heightened standard. White concurred on a narrower ground
than O’Connor did, so his opinion is controlling. As a result, a plaintiff can
satisfy his or her burden and receive the mixed motive analysis with direct or
circumstantial evidence.
In following the logic of Smith and the desire to create some stability in the
law, at a minimum the ADEA should have the mixed motive theory articulated
in Price Waterhouse.
B.

The ADEA and Mixed Motives: Why Society Needs the Mixed Motive
Theory

Public policy strongly supports finding a reasonable interpretation of the
ADEA that does not thwart its purpose to “promote employment of older
persons based on their ability rather than age.”213 Removing the mixed motive
theory severely limits the opportunity a plaintiff has to succeed on a claim.
The surviving standard of causation, “but for,” as Justice O’Connor noted, is

204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

Id. at 252, 261.
Id. at 258.
Id. at 259 (White, J., concurring).
Id. at 238–58 (plurality opinion); id. at 258–59, 261 (White, J., concurring).
Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 260–61 (plurality opinion).
Id. at 259 (White, J., concurring).
Id. at 276 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
Id.
Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 99 (2003).
29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (2006).
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tantamount to making the discrimination laws inapplicable to employment
decisions.214
A “but for” standard narrowly construes the ADEA and allows an
employer to commit harmful discriminatory acts without fear of liability. A
broader causation standard such as mixed motive is needed to deter
discriminatory employment practices based on ageism. First, the “but for”
standard misunderstands how humans make decisions.215 Many discriminatory
motivations will be unchecked because humans rarely make decisions “but
Second, ageism will cause unemployment or
for” one factor.216
underemployment, which will cause mental and economic hardship.217 Society
benefits with a less tolerant attitude to ageism because value is placed on
employing individuals based on ability and not on discriminatory
stereotypes.218 Failing to deter ageism on a wide scale basis is mentally and
economically harmful.219 Consequently, the ADEA needs a mixed motive
theory.
1. The Mixed Motive Theory is a Better Fit to the Human DecisionMaking Process
Human decision-making is a process.220 Simply defined, decision-making
is a choice made amongst two or more alternatives.221 But, more accurately,
decision-making is a multi-step process. The first step is problem recognition
and value assessment.222 During this stage, the decision maker must determine
his or her values and goals in order to orientate the decision maker to the
problem and help to define the problem itself.223 A problem is defined in

214. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 273 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
215. See infra Part IV.B.1.
216. See id.
217. See infra Part IV.B.2.
218. See id.
219. See id.
220. See JOHN D. MULLEN & BYRON M. ROTH, DECISION-MAKING: ITS LOGIC AND PROCESS
5–6 (1991). Human decision-making process is simplified because there are too many stimuli in
our environment to account for everything. See id. at 21–23. Humans have overcome these
limitations with techniques such as bias. Id. at 22–23. The use of these techniques is
unavoidable, without them, we would have to relearn everything, which is too much to process at
any given moment in time. Id. at 41–42. Understanding the role and inevitability of bias can
help limit the degree it affects the decision. Id. at 41.
221. J.T. BUCHANAN, DISCRETE AND DYNAMIC DECISION ANALYSIS 1 (1982).
222. MULLEN & ROTH, supra note 220, at 2.
223. Id. Values may simply consider the decision maker’s own good or may consider the
social good. Id. The value set the decision maker operates from affects the decision: Should I
vote for this candidate considering the effects on myself, my community, of my country? See id.
at 2, 81–82.
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consideration of the relevant acts and possible outcomes.224 The second and
third steps involve the creation and evaluation of alternatives.225 During these
stages, a decision maker considers each alternative’s benefit, regret, and cost to
determine how well each alternative will fulfill the goal.226 The fourth step is
the choice.227 After the choice is made, a decision maker will test the choice
against a wide range of possible circumstances to confirm the choice.228
In contrast, legal decisions strive to create finality and certainty in order to
simplify and condense the decision-making process.229 Legal reasoning
focuses on selecting a few facts, defining them, and then classifying them into
categories.230 Categorization simplifies the issue and “lends an aura of logical
inevitability to the legal conclusion that follows the categorization.”231 Legal
reasoning also strives to simplify the process because legal decisions need to
capture the public’s trust in order to achieve justice.232
An example of the legal reasoning is “but for” causation. With this
standard, courts rely on the myth that a decision can have one reason and have
defined “but for” causation to mean that, for example, age was the reason for
the decision and had a determinative influence on the outcome.233 Thus, legal
decisions appear more final and certain when the decision maker focuses the
scope of the decision by reducing the chaos of multiple facts and issues.234
Legal decision makers distrust uncertain factors, such as mixed motives,
because they introduce ambiguity.235 In order to avoid ambiguity, legal
decision makers discount that beliefs are influenced by cultural, biological, and

224. MICHAEL D. RESNIK, CHOICES: AN INTRODUCTION TO DECISION THEORY 6–7 (1987).
225. MULLEN & ROTH, supra note 220, at 3.
226. WM. E. SOUDER, MANAGEMENT DECISION METHODS FOR MANAGERS OF ENGINEERING
AND RESEARCH 4–6 (1980).
227. See MULLEN & ROTH, supra note 220, at 4–5.
228. SOUDER, supra note 226, at 5–6.
229. See Vladimir J. Konecni & Ebbe B. Ebbesen, The Mythology of Legal Decision Making,
7 INT’L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 5, 5–7 (1984). Legal reasoning by judges is projected as a complex
and well thought-out processes. Id. at 5. Judges say they think about problems complexly, but in
reality, they must simplify the issue because of human cognitive limitations. Id. at 5–7.
230. Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Legal Reasoning, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF THINKING
AND REASONING 685, 698 (Keith J. Holyoak & Robert G. Morrison eds., 2005).
231. Linda L. Berger, How Embedded Knowledge Structures Affect Judicial Decision
Making: A Rhetorical Analysis of Metaphor, Narrative and Imagination in Child Custody, 18 S.
CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 259, 264–65 (2009).
232. See John A Humbach, The National Association of Honest Lawyers: An Essay on
Honesty, “Lawyer Honesty” and Public Trust in the Legal System, 20 PACE L. REV. 93, 93, 106–
08 (1999-2000); Ellsworth, supra note 230, at 697–99.
233. Gross v. FBL Fin. Serv., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2350 (2009) (quoting Hazen Paper Co. v.
Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610 (1993)).
234. Konecni & Ebbesen, supra note 229, at 6–9.
235. Jonathan Uffelman, Hamlet was a Law Student: A “Dramatic” Look at Emotion’s Effect
on Analogical Reasoning, 96 GEO. L.J. 1725, 1773 (2008).
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situational forces because the actual influence these factors have on an
individual is unknown.236 Not surprisingly, these decision makers are also
skeptical of applying overarching theories of human decision-making and bias
to a single individual.237 This distrust may be because social science research
results are largely inconclusive and ambiguous when compared to legal
decisions. Yet, the use of probabilistic social science research data can also
help achieve justice.238 The ADEA targets intangible motivations of human
behavior. Quantifying and qualifying human nature and motivations is not
precise.239 However, social science research can be especially helpful in
understanding the human decision-making process and the influences on a
particular decision.240
Legal decision-making is disjointed from typical decision-making because
few problems in life present themselves in such an orderly fashion. Decisionmaking must be done under crisis, risk, certainty, stress, knowledge, ignorance,
long-term deadlines, short-term deadlines, or convergence of any of these
factors. 241 To add to the complexity, though decision makers make decisions
in the moment, the decision is not isolated in time.242 Instead, the decision is
the product of years of stimuli.243 Because of their complexity, it is too
difficult to isolate any one decision in time or in logical connectivity.244 One
researcher analogized the decision-making process to the manufacturing of
goods.245 Each mini or sub-decision is the building block of the next until the

236. Ellsworth, supra note 230, at 700.
237. Id. at 699.
238. For example, logical reasoning presumes that eliminating emotion in decision-making
promotes justice. Uffelman, supra note 235, at 1773. However, a judge’s use of emotion in such
decisions may allow him or her to more fully understand the intricacies of the situation and create
the necessary social change, which achieves justice. Id.
239. Gross v. FBL Fin. Serv., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2358–59 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
240. Ellsworth, supra note 230, at 699.
241. Decision-making theory is comprised of multiple theories. Though no one decisionmaking model can fit exactly the decision at hand to be made, different models lend themselves to
different situations. HOY & TARTER, supra note 69, at 86–89. Professors Hoy and Tarter discuss
these decision-making models: Classical, Administrative, Mixed Scanning, Incremental, Garbage
Can and Political. Id. at 90. Whereas William Souder discusses decision-making along more
traditional models: Economic, Strategies, Satisfying, and Behavioral theories. SOUDER, supra
note 226, at 62.
242. Henry Mintzber et al., The Structure of “Unstructed” Decision Processes, 21 ADMIN.
SCI. Q. 246, 252 (1976).
243. Id.
244. STAFFORD BEER, PLATFORM FOR CHANGE 294 (1975). Complex and innovative
decision-making is not evaluated in decisive phases but in constant relationship to information
gathering, development, and evaluation of alternatives throughout the process. Everhard Witte,
Field Research on Complex Decision-Making Processes—The Phase Theorem, 72 INT’L STUD.
MGMT. & ORG. 156, 180 (1972).
245. Witte, supra note 244, at 157.
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final decision is reached. Thus, decisions and their outcomes should not be,
and likely cannot be, considered simple creatures. 246
Due to the complexity of the process, a decision maker has several barriers
to making unbiased decisions. During the process, he or she is likely to jump
to a conclusion, prematurely evaluate the criteria, over rely on experience,
prematurely commit to possible conclusions, confuse the decision’s problems
and symptoms, or not diversify the alternatives.247 Cognitive dissonance is a
common way a decision maker distorts the process. Decision makers are
uncomfortable when their beliefs are not supported by newly acquired
knowledge, so decision makers will avoid cognitive dissonance whenever
possible. 248
The decision maker also distorts the process with confirmation bias, which
is focusing on ways to affirm a conclusion.249 The decision maker disregards
or effectively explains away unsupportive information.250 Decision makers
will sacrifice the quality of the information or simply limit the quantity of
research in order to avoid finding their conclusion is wrong.251
In addition, primacy also distorts the decision-making process. A decision
maker is likely to place a disproportionate influence on information discovered
early in a process, making how a problem begins indicative of how the
decision maker will resolve it.252 The primacy of the initial information
distorts how the decision maker comprehends new information, especially
inconsistent information.253 For example, in hiring decisions, the initial
screening interview impressions heavily influence the post-interview hiring
decision.254
Finally, issue presentation and personal experience distort the decisionmaking process because they affect how the decision maker solves the
problem. How the problem is framed or presented will affect how the decision

246.
247.
248.
249.

See Kurt Ronn, Rethinking Talent Acquisition, BUS. WK. ONLINE, March 6, 2007, at 10.
SOUDER, supra note 226, at 24–25.
MULLER & ROTH, supra note 220, at 33.
Daniel C. Molden & E. Tory Higgins, Motivated Thinking, in THE CAMBRIDGE
HANDBOOK OF THINKING AND REASONING, supra note 230, at 296–97.
250. MULLER & ROTH, supra note 220, at 36; Molden & Higgins, supra note 249, at 296–97;
Peter H. Ditto et al., Motivated Sensitivity to Preference-Inconsistence Information, 75 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 53, 64 (1998) (finding that when study participants faced
unfavorable feedback, the participants questioned the quality of the information; but when other
participants faced favorable feedback, they accepted the feedback as true without criticizing it
even though the information was also of questionable quality).
251. Molden & Higgins, supra note 249, at 299.
252. Samuel D. Bond et al, Information Distortion in the Evaluation of a Single Option, 102
ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESS 240, 240 (2007).
253. Id. at 250.
254. Daniel M. Cable & Tom Gilovick, Looked Over or Overlooked?: Prescreening
Decisions and Postinterview Evaluations, 83 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 501, 505 (1998).
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maker understands and seeks to solve it.255 Generally, a decision maker will
not try to look at a problem in a new light or even recognize it can be
Similarly, habits, experience, knowledge,
conceptualized differently.256
preconceived beliefs, and preferences all affect the context in which the
decision maker understands the issues.257 Even how a decision maker
evaluates the alternatives can be affected by the order in which he or she
learned of them.258 Therefore, an alternative decision will not necessarily be
chosen for its strengths.
Not surprisingly, decision makers have a hard time recalling the reasons
for their decisions. Our beliefs are important to us, but, even with firmly held
beliefs, we quickly forget the belief’s origin.259 So, what a decision maker
does recall is distorted. For example, prejudice unconsciously distorts decision
recall. In a study, while participants displayed no overt bias in hiring minority
candidates, a week later the participants could not accurately recall the
candidates.260 Though the candidates had identical responses, participants
recalled the minority candidates answered the questions less intelligently than
majority candidates did.261 Decision makers may not be able to identify that
they cannot accurately recall reasons for their decision.
Recall is also distorted by the decision maker’s actual actions as well as his
or her knowledge of what happened.262 If the decision maker believes the
decision is favorable, hindsight bias is greater, and the decision maker’s

255. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of
Choice, 211 SCI. 453, 457 (1981).
256. Id. at 457–58 (“Individuals who face a decision problem and have a definite preference
(i) might have a different preference in a different framing of the same problem, (ii) are normally
unaware of alternative frames and of the potential effects on the relative attractiveness of options,
(iii) would wish their preferences to be independent of frame, but (iv) are often uncertain how to
resolve detected inconsistencies.”).
257. SOUDER, supra note 226, at 16; Robyn A. LeBoeuf & Eldar B. Shafir, Decision Making,
in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF THINKING AND REASONING, supra note 230, at 244.
258. JEAN-CHARLES POMEROL & SERGIO BARBA-ROMERO, MULTICRITERION DECISION IN
MANAGEMENT: PRINCIPALS AND PRACTICE 91–92 (2000).
259. MICHAEL S. GAZZANIGA, THE ETHICAL BRAIN 161 (2005).
260. Ricardo A. Frazer & Uco J. Wiersma, Prejudice versus Discrimination in the
Employment Interview: We May Hire Equally, but Our Memories Harbor Prejudice, 54 HUM.
REL. 173, 186 (2001).
261. Id. at 186.
262. Rik Pieters et al., Biased Memory For Prior Decision Making: Evidence from a
Longitudinal Field Study, 99 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESS 34, 45 (2006). For
example, before Y2K, study participants predicted something big would happen and underwent
preparations for such an event. Id. at 45. No big event was associated with Y2K. Thus,
participants incorrectly remembered they knew all along nothing would happen and, therefore,
did little preparation. Id.
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memory of the decision is more supportive of it.263 For example, if a decision
maker receives positive feedback from discharging an employee, he or she is
likely to remember, in hindsight, the supportive factors and fewer of the
unsupportive factors. In short, decision makers overestimate the accuracy of
their judgment.264 Decision recall will not accurately reflect the considerations
that made the decision.
The “but for” causation standard is incompatible with human decisionmaking. The decision-making process is a complex process, with a multitude
of criteria and influences. The law is disingenuous when it requires complex
decisions be boiled down to one defining factor. Also, because decision
makers act in complex environments, it is unlikely a decision had a “but for”
cause and the “but for” cause can be identified.265 When the law asks an
employer why it acted, the employer cannot accurately recall the decision’s
factors. Instead, motives are ascribed after the fact when it is difficult, if not
impossible, to determine the influence each factor had on the decision.266 If an
employer cannot accurately recall his motivation and what he or she does
remember is distorted, the law should not require a sole reason. A mixed
motive accounts for the shortcomings of knowing what motivated a decision
and/or distortion in decision recall. Thus, a mixed motive theory is necessary
for the ADEA to fulfill its purpose.267
2. Ageism is Harmful
As a society, we should be concerned about ageism and its discriminatory
effects because a substantial portion of the population is covered by the
ADEA. The Baby Boomer generation alone is over seventy million strong, all
over age forty, and all covered by the ADEA.268 This generation accounted for
roughly half of the workforce in 2006.269 Americans over 65, those more
vulnerable to discrimination, belong to the fastest growing segment of the
working population in the 1990s at 20%.270 “Starting on Jan. 1, [2011,] our
79-million-strong baby boom generation will be turning 65 at the rate of one
every eight seconds. That means more than 10,000 people per day, or more
than four million per year, for the next 19 years . . . .”271 In June 2008, more

263. Therese A. Louie et al., Tackling the Monday-Morning Quarterback: Application of
Hindsight Bias in Decision-Making, 25 SOC. COGNITION 32, 35 (2007).
264. ROBERT J. STERNBERG & TALIA BEN-ZEEV, COMPLEX COGNITION: THE PSYCHOLOGY
OF HUMAN THOUGHT 191 (2001).
265. Gross v. FBL Fin. Serv., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2358–59 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
266. Id. at 2358.
267. 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (2006).
268. HEDGE ET AL., supra note 131, at 37–38.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 38.
271. Sandra Day O’Connor et al., The Age of Alzheimer’s, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2010, at A33.
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than 2 million workers age 55 and over were unemployed and seeking work.272
These unemployed workers likely faced difficulties in finding new
employment.273
If age discrimination is left unchecked,274 more older workers will be
forced out of the workforce entirely or into lower skilled jobs. Forced
retirement or underemployment is harmful because many people derive
satisfaction and identity from their jobs.275 Social roles such as worker, parent,
or spouse form the basis of self-identity, so performance and assessment in one
of these roles correlates to how a person perceives his or her self-worth.276 A
worker may have negative self-worth if he or she is un- or underemployed.
Job loss adversely affects personal relationships, physical health, and mental
health.277 Forced un- or underemployment has negative repercussions on selfidentity and mental health.
Older workers also need to remain in the work place to remain fiscally
healthy. Growth of employer-based pension plans has stagnated with only
roughly half of all private-sector workers covered by pension plans.278
Retirees must rely on savings, investments, and government assistance to
replace pension plan funds.279 Health care costs are also rising. Retirees are
now responsible for bearing a larger burden of higher health care costs, which

272. Liz Wolgemuth, When Age Bias Hinders the Job Hunt, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Sep.
30, 2009, at 72.
273.
The Labor Department studied re-employment rates in January 2004 for workers who had
been let go between January 2001 and December 2003 from jobs they had held at least
three years. The data show that most workers ages 20 to 54 had landed new jobs (rates in
that group varied from 65 to 69 percent). In contrast, just 56 percent of workers ages 55
to 64 and a slim 24 percent of those 65 and older had found re-employment. Many older,
displaced workers had dropped out of the workforce by the time they were surveyed.
Id.
274. Some scholars argue the market itself will correct work place ageism as the pool of
potential younger workers decreases. Sara E. Rix, The Aging of the American Workforce, 81
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 593, 610 (2006). Falling fertility rates and a leveling of women joining the
work force have already caused the older worker segment to compromise a larger segment of the
labor pool. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, OLDER WORKERS: LABOR CAN HELP
EMPLOYERS AND EMPLOYEES PLAN BETTER FOR THE FUTURE 6 (2005), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0680.pdf. In addition, employers will be compelled to retain
older workers, who have experience and institutional knowledge, in order transfer the knowledge
and skills to younger workers. Id. at 14.
275. HEDGE ET AL., supra note 131, at 165.
276. Michael R. Frone & Marcia Russell, Job Stressors, Job Involvement and Employee
Health: A Test of Identity Theory, 68 J. OF OCCUPATIONAL & ORG. PSYCHOL. 1, 12 (1998).
277. RICHARD H. PRICE ET AL., Job Loss: Hard Times and Eroded Identity, in PERSPECTIVES
ON LOSS: A SOURCEBOOK 308–09 (J.H. Harvey ed., 1998).
278. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 274, at 10.
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result from increasing costs, decreasing treatment coverage, and plan eligibility
restrictions.280 A retiree must handle these increased financial responsibilities
even after the economy has taken a toll on their personal savings. From
September 2007 to 2008, retirement accounts lost roughly eighteen percent of
their value.281 As a result of market conditions’ effect on retirement savings in
2000, twenty percent of potential retirees pushed back retirement in order to
build up their retirement savings.282 So, given the current state of economic
welfare, the longer an individual is employed, the less likely he or she will
outlive his or her savings.283 Older workers need the law to protect them and
keep them employable in order to cope with all of their financial
responsibilities. Accordingly, the ADEA must take steps, such as including
the mixed motive theory, to better protect older workers.
Finally, as a society, it is to our advantage to keep older workers employed
because it keeps our economy healthy. If older workers remain employed,
they can remain self-sufficient instead of relying on public welfare
programs.284 Large numbers of citizens using public welfare programs puts a
huge fiscal strain on public financing.285 In addition, older people are
productive, talented workers.286 Removing them from the workforce reduces
the talent pool. By removing older workers from the workforce, the economy
is squeezed in two ways: by increasing public funding to welfare programs and
by losing out on a talented labor force.
CONCLUSION
Age discrimination is harmful. Older workers who are discriminated
against suffer mental and financial hardships.287 The effects can be
devastating. Thus, the law needs to afford proper protection.
In order to do this, the ADEA needs the mixed motive theory. Recall from
the introduction, Gregory, who produced evidence his employer thought he
was too old to work, could not prove a viable claim under “but for” causation.
It is precisely because of situations such as Gregory’s the mixed motives
theory should be reintroduced. The law can reasonably interpret a mixed
motive theory from 1) the text and purpose of the ADEA, 2) Congressional
280. Id. at 11.
281. RICHARD W. JOHNSON ET AL., HOW IS THE ECONOMIC TURMOIL AFFECTING OLDER
AMERICANS? 2 (2008).
282. Rix, supra note 274, at 601.
283. HEDGE ET AL., supra note 131, at 165–66.
284. GREGORY, supra note 8, at 17; DEP’T. OF LABOR, supra note 14, at 97–104; Matt
Sedensky, Forced to Retire, Some Take Social Security Early, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Aug. 8, 2010,
available at http://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory?id=11352830.
285. GREGORY, supra note 8, at 17; DEP’T. OF LABOR, supra note 14, at 97–104.
286. GREGORY, supra note 8, at 17; DEP’T. OF LABOR, supra note 14, at 16.
287. See supra Part IV.B.2.
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intent and the CRA of 1991, or 3) the Price Waterhouse’s articulation of mixed
motives. Because a mixed motive theory better conforms to the decisionmaking process, it can more effectively deter discrimination.
The “but for” theory is inadequate because decision makers distort factors
while forming the decision and when attempting to recall what happened.288
This distortion reduces the chance motive will be adequately ascribed.289 The
mixed motive theory, however, recognizes these shortcomings and attaches
liability when it is known an illegal factor had a motivating influence on the
decision.290
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